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Note
Strangers in a Strange Land: Assessing the Fate of
Foreign Nationals Arrested in the United States
by State and Local Authorities
Gregory Dean Gisvold
The possibility of arrest and imprisonment in a foreign jail
is perhaps the worst nightmare of the international traveller.'
Joseph Stanley Faulder, a Canadian citizen working in Texas,
faced this frightening situation during the late 1970s when
Texas authorities arrested Faulder and charged him with the
murder of a prominent local citizen.2 Faulder's unique physical
and mental characteristics further complicated the daunting
task of protecting himself within a foreign legal system: Faulder
suffered from organic brain damage.3 A Texas court convicted
1. "Detained foreign nationals are inevitably distressed by the prospect of
securing and preserving their rights in a legal system with whose institutions
and rules they are not familiar, especially since they may be unable to converse
in the language of the detaining state." LuIm T. LEE, CoNsULAR LAw AND PRAc-
TICE 145 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter LEE, CoNsuIn LAw]; see FRANK NEWxiA &
DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs: LAw, POLICY, AND PROCESS
32-34 (1990) (citing RICHARD D. ATvNs & ROBERT L. PISANI, THE HASSLE OF
YouR LIFE: A HANDBOOK FOR THE FRIENDs AND FAMIES OF AMERICANS IMPRIS-
ONED ABROAD 4-5, 10-12 (1982)); see also Mark A. Tarasiewicz, Lawyer Helps
Troubled Americans Abroad, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 18, 1993, at 1 (offer-
ing examples of legal help available to United States citizens imprisoned
abroad). See generally U.S. Citizens Detained in Foreign Jails on Drug Related
Charges: Hearing before the Sub-comm. on Foreign Assistance of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977) (describing some
foreign penal and judicial systems as systems "Americans would not tolerate at
home").
2. Faulder v. State, 611 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874 (1980); see also Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
3. Joseph Stanley Faulder grew up in Alberta, Canada, the youngest of
three children in a middle class family. Applicant's Amended Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 5, Ex Parte Faulder, (No. 10,740) (Tex. Crim. App.
1992). Faulder suffered from both significant organic brain damage, stemming
from a childhood accident, and alcoholism. Id. at 5-7. Despite these setbacks,
Faulder married and had two daughters. Id. at 7. During his seven-year mar-
riage, he lived and worked in British Columbia. Id. In 1970, Faulder's mar-
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Faulder and sentenced him to death.4
Faulder would likely have presented a stronger defense at
his trial5 had he enjoyed the counsel of Canadian consular rep-
resentatives stationed in the United States.6 The inaction of
riage dissolved and he moved away from the town where the couple had lived.
Id. He left Canada in 1973 and traveled to the United States. Id. at 8.
Although the local authorities knew of Faulder's foreign citizenship at the
time of his arrest and trial, they made no effort to notify his consulate of his
detention. See Letters from the Texas Attorney General's Office to Canadian
law enforcement agencies (1976-93) (on file with the University of Minnesota
Law Review) [hereinafter Texas Attorney General's letters]. Additionally, they
did not inform Faulder of his right to seek consular protection from Canadian
representatives. Id. The Texas officials did contact the criminal justice organs
of the Canadian government, however, to learn whether Faulder had any crimi-
nal or penal record in Canada. Id.
4. Faulder, 611 S.W.2d at 630.
5. Faulder's attorney could have obtained substantial evidence located
only in Canada, including background information and favorable testimony
from Faulder's family. Applicant's Amended Application for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, supra note 3, at 14-15, 18. This evidence could only have surfaced if
either Faulder's attorney recognized the importance of Faulder's citizenship or
the Canadian consulate knew of Faulder's detention and cooperated with the
defense attorney.
Mitigating evidence is of paramount importance to a successful defense in a
capital trial. In Texas, organic brain damage, alcoholism, and the supportive
testimony of relatives may all serve as mitigating factors for jury consideration
in a capital trial. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318-19 (1989) (stat-
ing that organic brain damage deserves special jury instruction); Lackey v.
State, 819 S.W.2d 111, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (opinion on rehearing) (find-
ing alcoholism to be a mitigating factor); Ex Parte Baldree, 810 S.W.2d 213,
216-217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc) (stating that evidence of a positive
family background reflects "his character and bears upon his propensity, or lack
thereof, for committing future violent acts"). For almost twenty years,
Faulder's family believed that he had died. Upon learning of his incarceration,
one of Faulder's daughters traveled to Texas to testify at an evidentiary hear-
ing. Rick Mofina, Family Awaits Father's Fate, CALGARY HERALD, July 12,
1992, at A3.
6. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations defines consul as "any
person... entrusted... with the exercise of consular functions." Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 1(d), 21 U.S.T. 77, 80, 596
U.N.T.S. 261, 264 [hereinafter Vienna Consular Convention]. One cannot eas-
ily compile a comprehensive listing of consular duties because they vary by situ-
ation. LEE, CoNsULAR LAW, supra note 1, at 115. Among other functions,
consular representatives help facilitate legal relationships between the sending
and receiving States. Id. at 231-94. (For clarity, this Note will, except in quota-
tions, use "States" to denote nation-states and "states" to denote members of the
United States of America.)
Historically, consular representatives attempted to facilitate international
trade, a duty that remains central to a consul's mission. Id. at 189-99, 303-43;
see also infra notes 26, 37 and accompanying text (discussing consular duties).
Consular representatives function as the first step in travel and immigration
procedures, id. at 200-30, and provide essential aid in refugee matters. Id. at
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Texas officials, however, foreclosed options otherwise available
to aliens 7 convicted of crimes in the United States.8 Nonethe-
352-65. The assistance denied Faulder, however, represents one of the foremost
consular activities: the protection of fellow nationals. Id. at 124-88; see also
infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (describing and providing examples of
the consular protective functions).
The Canadian government considers "providing assistance to Canadians
abroad.., one of the important tasks carried out by consular officials." Brief
for the Canadian Government as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner's Re-
quest for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Faulder v. Collins, (Civ.
6:92CV755) (E.D. Tex. 1993) [hereinafter Canadian Amicus Brief]. To help a
Canadian citizen detained or imprisoned abroad, a Canadian consul
WILL notify [the family] of the arrest or detention of a relative if re-
quested by the person detained;
WILL visit or maintain contact with the prisoner;
WILL attempt to obtain case-related information to the extent that
this cannot be obtained directly by the prisoner (or the prisoner's rep-
resentative) and provided the prisoner so requests; WILL provide
available information on such matters as the local judicial and prison
systems, approximate time requirements for court action, typical
sentences in relation to the alleged offense, bail provisions, transfer of
offender procedures (if applicable) and methods of transferring funds
Id. at 7 (citing 11 CONSULAR MANUAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ExTEaNAL AFFAims
AND INTERNATioNAL TRADE OF CANADA annex C, ch. 3).
7. International law defines "alien" as someone in a country not his or her
own. See JAmms R. Fox, DICTIONARY OF INTERNATioNAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
17 (1992); DAVID WEISSBRODT, LMGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUT-
SHELL 17 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter WEISSBRODT, NUTSHELL]. The United States
Congress defines an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1988). For legal purposes, four classes of aliens
exist: those seeking entry to the United States, those admitted as immigrants
or as permanent resident aliens, those admitted as non-immigrants or tempo-
rary visitors, and those living in the United States as undocumented or illegal
aliens. WEISSBRODT, NUTSHELL, supra, at 351. Most legal protections for aliens
extend to resident aliens, who most closely resemble citizens. Id. at 352. Resi-
dent aliens live permanently in the United States, pay taxes, are subject to mil-
itary service, and are part of their communities. Id.
A "citizen" belongs to the political community in which he or she usually
resides. The citizen owes this community a duty of continuous allegiance. See
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Citizens in the United States
have the right to vote and hold office, and cannot be expelled from or denied the
right to enter the country. U.S. CoNST. amends. XIV, § 2, XV, XVI, XXIV and
XXVI (voting); id. art. I, § 3, art. H, § 1 (holding office). Moreover, the constitu-
tion specifically provides certain exclusive rights to citizens as benefitting from
certain rights. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Although both
citizens and aliens may serve in the military, only citizens may serve on a jury.
28 U.S.C. § 1865 (b)(1) (1988) (prohibiting aliens from serving on juries); In Re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 727 n.18 (1973) (noting that aliens may serve in mili-
tary and must take an oath).
In contrast, an alien owes a duty of continuous allegiance to a nation differ-
ent from the one in which he is located. Furthermore, an alien may not enjoy
the same rights and privileges as a citizen.
8. One common long-term solution for persons imprisoned in foreign jails
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less, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held that the
failure of Texas authorities to accord Faulder his right to consu-
lar protection did not require a new trial.9 Faulder's situation
implicates not only a serious issue of United States compliance
with international law, but also an important question of feder-
alism; namely, the need for state and municipal governments to
alter their arrest practices regarding foreign nationals to help
the federal government comply with a treaty.
The inherent unfamiliarity of a foreign legal system pro-
vides little sense of security to visiting aliens. Nonetheless,
tourists continue to travel, confident in the knowledge that their
governments station fellow citizens as consuls'0 in countries
around the world.". Protecting their nationals from the perils of
foreign legal systems represents one of the foremost duties of
consular representatives. 12 The consul's protective function in-
is the use of prisoner transfer treaties. These treaties enable arresting States
to return alien prisoners to their home States to serve out their sentence after
trial. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Perspectives on the Transfer of Prisoners Be-
tween the United States and Other Countries, in INTERNATIONAL CRnMAL LAw:
A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 271 (Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif
Bassiouni eds., 1987). See generally Pfeifer v. United States Bureau of Prisons,
468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal. 1979), affd 615 F.2d 873 (1980), cert. denied 447
U.S. 908 (1980) (holding that the prisoner may serve sentence in U.S. prison for
crimes committed in Mexico). The United States and Canada have enjoyed a
viable prisoner transfer treaty relationship since 1978. Treaty on the Execution
of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T. 6263, (entered into force
July 19, 1978). As Faulder never had the opportunity to request that the appro-
priate Canadian authorities be notified of his arrest, no one in Canada, govern-
ment official or family member, could suggest an alternative to the death
penalty.
9. The Texas court has not yet published a written decision. Weekly Case
Summaries, TEx. LAw., Dec. 14, 1992, at 19 (noting that a Texas court had de-
nied Faulder's habeas corpus petition in Ex Parte Joseph Stanley Faulder, (No.
10,740) (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Faulder has also sought federal habeas corpus
relief. Faulder v. Collins, (Civ. 6:92CV755) (E.D.Tex. 1993).
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the functions and
duties of consuls).
11. Consular authorities may differ from diplomatic authorities. LEE, CON-
suLAR LAw, supra note 1, at 72. Diplomatic missions cost a great deal of money
and do not exist everywhere. Where a State has not established a formal diplo-
matic mission, it will often choose to conduct diplomatic relations through con-
sular posts. Id. Consular posts also do not exist everywhere, and sometimes
States may share consular responsibility. See, e.g., id. at 70-71 (stating that
Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, and United States
share staffing of a consular post in Oaxaca, Mexico). See generally id. at 593-
604 (describing general differences between consular and diplomatic functions);
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE G.P.O. No. 1822 AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE 3 [hereinaf-
ter AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE] (same).
12. The boundaries of this protective function are not easily defined. At its
most basic, it is the duty of consuls to visit arrested foreign nationals and to
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corporates a wide variety of activities, including: observing tri-
als,13 attending interrogations, 14 visiting detainees to explain
the foreign legal system's relevant aspects, 15 or notifying a de-
tainee's family of his or her arrest.16 Aliens in the United
States, like Faulder, rarely receive these basic consular serv-
ices. 17 State and local law enforcement officials, unfamiliar with
inform them of their predicament. LEE, CONSULAR LAW, supra note 1, at 124-
27. Perhaps the most important aspect of this duty is that the consul, a fellow
national of the sending State who speaks the same language as the arrested
national, represents familiarity. Id. at 145 ("The consul's presence may also
help assuage the distress of detained nationals."); see also infra notes 13-16 (de-
tailing different aspects of the consular protective function). See generally Bu-
REAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 9782, U.S. CONSULS
HELP AMERICANS ABROAD (1990) (describing some of the protective activities of
United States consular officers).
This protective function of consuls has a distinguished history. It existed in
almost every consular treaty concluded prior to the Vienna Consular Conven-
tion. LEE, CONSULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 128. The Vienna Consular Conven-
tion, however, altered the right of consular protection from a longstanding
practice of "international courtesy" to one of right. Id. at 138. See generally
EDwIN M. BORCHARD, THE DimomAmc PROTECTION OF CITIZENs ABROAD (1915)
(offering various descriptions of the importance of diplomatic or consular pro-
tection); B. SEN, A DIProMAT's HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
(1965) (same).
13. In early 1984, Nigerian authorities arrested Marie McBroom, an Amer-
ican businesswoman, in the capital city of Lagos. Obafemi Oredein, UPI, Feb.
27, 1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Five months after im-
prisoning her, Nigerian authorities charged her with illegally dealing in oil and
gasoline, an offense punishable by death. Id. McBroom's trial took place in
early 1985. Id. American consular personnel attended each day of the trial to
monitor the case. Id. The trial court acquitted McBroom and consular officials
sought to expedite her release. Id.
14. In 1992, Chinese officers searched the Beijing office of Lena H. Sun, a
journalist with the Washington Post. Lena H. Sun, Casualties of a Paper War
in China; Every Day Citizens Are Arrested; This Time, They Were My Friends,
WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at C1. They also interrogated her for three hours.
Id. During the entire search and interrogation, U.S. embassy officials waited
outside the door. Id. The Chinese authorities did not allow the U.S. officials
inside. Id. Sun, however, shouted in English all the questions which the Chi-
nese police asked her loudly enough for the embassy officials to hear. Id.
15. Canadian Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 7; LEE, CONSULAR LAw, supra
note 1, at 166 (citing 7 FOREIGN AFFAIS MANUAL § 413.4 (1982)).
16. This list is not exhaustive as functions vary with the circumstances.
See AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE, supra note 11, at 5-6 (listing U.S. Depart-
ment of State guidelines regarding consular services and protective functions);
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 12 (same).
17. For example, when New York police arrested a prominent Malaysian
businessman, they offered him neither the means nor the opportunity to notify
his consular officials. Kalimullah Hassan, US Police Abused Me, Says KL Busi-
nessman, STArrs TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1993, at 12. If he had received the opportu-
nity, this businessman likely possessed the knowledge or sophistication to
demand his right to consular protection. Id.
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the right to consular protection, neither inform aliens of their
right to seek consular notification, nor inform the alien's consu-
late of the arrest.
Faulder's situation is far from unique.1 8 Each year govern-
ments detain or arrest thousands of foreign nationals, 19 and
these numbers promise to escalate as the frequency of interna-
tional travel increases.20 At a time when the presence of aliens
in the United States is not only increasing,21 but also generating
significant debate, 22 the relevant international legal principles
applicable to those visiting a foreign country merit examination.
18. Faulder is one of three Canadians imprisoned in the United States who
awaits imposition of the death penalty. Peter Cheney, A Canadian on Death
Row Awaits Justice, American-style, TooNro STAR, Mar. 18, 1993, at A26; see
also Peter Cheney, Remorse on Death Row, ToRoNTo STAR, Mar. 19, 1993, at
A25 (discussing Canadians on death row in the United States). Of the 563
Canadians known to be in foreign jails, most are serving time in the U.S., the
Caribbean, and Western Europe. Wade Hemsworth & Les Whittington, Hard
Time, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 5, 1992, at B2.
19. One need only review the newspapers to learn how often foreign na-
tionals land in jail. In 1988, West German authorities detained hundreds of
people after fans at a European soccer championship match began brawling.
Karen DeYoung, British Hooligans Invading Europe, WASH. PosT, June 14,
1988, at Al. In Stuttgart, West Germany, officials arrested eighty-nine British
citizens in a single day. Id. In 1984, about 3,000 United States citizens found
themselves in foreign jails, facing sentences ranging from long prison terms to
death. See Joshua Hammer, A Bad Deal and Harsh Justice Make an American
Businesswoman a Prisoner of Fate in Nigeria, PEoPLE, Jan. 14, 1985, at 38.
Sometimes, the activities which precipitated their arrests did not constitute
crimes in the United States. Chris Torchia, Foreign Prison No Bed Of Roses For
Americans, L. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1992, at A6.
20. In 1990, after registering the first travel surplus ever, the United
States Commerce Department's Travel and Tourism Administration predicted
that 40 million foreign nationals would visit the United States that year. U.S.
Registers a Travel Surplus in 1989 for First Time Ever, BusNEss AMERICA, Feb.
12, 1990, at 36.
21. Foreign citizens are streaming into the United States as visitors and
immigrants in greater numbers than ever before. Currently, immigrants com-
prise eight percent of the U.S. population; annually, between 1.2 and 1.9 million
immigrants, legal and illegal, enter the United States. See Frank D. Bean, Im-
migration Combatants Overlook the New Reality, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1993,
at 1; Henry N. Ervin, Illegal Immigration: A Heavy Burden, SAN DiEGo UNION-
TIB., Aug. 29, 1993, at G3.
22. See, e.g., Michael D'Antonio, Apocalypse Soon: The Latest Overpopula-
tion Alarm Has a Twist: Not Only Lives, But Lifestyles Are At Stake, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1993, at 18; Suzanne Espinosa & Benjamin Pimental, Anger At
Immigration Overflow, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 27, 1993, at Al. Concerns stemming
from increased immigration have prompted the introduction of several bills in
Congress designed to limit immigration. See Bob Dart, Groundswell Rising
Against Illegal Aliens, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 19, 1993, at As; Maria Pu-
ente, Immigration 'Issue Of The 90s" Critics Cite Border Influx, Rights Abuses,
USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1993, at 10A.
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Despite the importance of consular representatives and the in-
ternational legal principles governing their actions, however,
legal literature fails to adequately address the subject.23
This Note considers state and municipal respect for rights
arising under international law, specifically addressing whether
states should adapt their law enforcement procedures to avoid
impinging on federal primacy in the conduct of foreign affairs
and comport with international practice. Part I of this Note in-
troduces consular law, the salient aspects of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relations,24 related facets of international law,
and the United States' current treatment of foreign nationals
detained or arrested 25 here. In Part II, this Note demonstrates
that this treatment fails to safeguard the international treaty-
based rights of the foreign nationals, violates domestic legal
principles, and detracts from United States foreign policy. Part
III proposes a revised practice for law enforcement in the United
States, which will observe the rights stemming from the Vienna
Consular Convention. Part III also suggests a standard of re-
view for claims alleging violations of foreign nationals' consular
rights. This Note concludes that only by consistently and scru-
23. Professor Luke Lee of American University's Washington College of
Law has published a book on consular law. LEE, CONSuLAR LAW, supra note 1.
He has also authored one of the very few books on the Vienna Consular Conven-
tion. LUKE T. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONsULAR RELATIONS (1966) [here-
inafter LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION]. Although other discussions of consular law
exist, they typically offer little more than a cursory treatment of the subject in
the context of a larger work. See, e.g., ARTHUR NUSSBAUm, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1954); L. OPPENHEm, OPPENHEm'S INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); GRA-
HAi H. STUART, AmERIcAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONsuLAR PRACTICE (2d ed. 1952).
Because it presents a more robust and popular subject, most commentators
choose to focus on diplomatic legal principles, although some also offer a modest
view of consular law. See, e.g., DPLONACY UNDER A FOREIGN FLAG: WHEN NA-
TIONS BREAK RELATIONS (David D. Newsom ed., 1990); DIPLOmACY IN A DANGER-
OUS WORLD: PROTECTION FOR DPLOMATS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (Natalie
Kaufman Hevener ed., 1986). Law review articles discussing consular law as it
relates to U.S. domestic law or to U.S. citizens tend to be limited to aspects of
consular immunity. See, e.g., Lori J. Shapiro, Foreign Relations Law: Modern
Developments in Diplomatic Immunity, 1989 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 281 (1990);
Michael Flemming, Note, Developments in Diplomatic and Consular Real Prop-
erty Tax Exemptions, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 771 (1984); Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Note, The Scope of Consular Immunity Under the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations: Towards a Principled Interpretation, 88 COLumI. L. REV.
841 (1988).
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (detailing consular duties).
25. This Note will use the words "detention" and "arrest" interchangeably.
To arrest someone is to "deprive [that] person of his liberty by legal authority."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990).
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pulously honoring foreign nationals' Vienna Convention privi-
leges can the United States expect other nations to reciprocate.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ALIENS ABROAD
A. CONSULAR LAW
"Consular relations" encompasses all relations arising be-
tween two States when the sending State establishes consular
functions26 within the receiving State.27 Consuls function as
agents of their respective States, residing abroad to expedite
and safeguard their government's interests.28 The legal princi-
ples governing consular law comprise a subset of international
law,29 informed by a significant historical tradition.30 Modern
26. "Consul" has two meanings, one of rank and one of function. When
denoting rank, one refers to the head of a consular post as the "Consul." More
specifically, "consul" refers to the functions which the staff of the consular post
perform. JuLIUS I. PUENTE, THE FOREIGN CONSUL 11 (1987). A consul's duties
encompass three broad categories: commercial, administrative, and civil. In
her capacity as an agent for her government regarding commercial matters, a
consul might ensure that the receiving State observed treaty provisions or over-
see the organization of merchant vessels visiting the receiving State's ports. Id.
at 57-59. As administrative representatives, consuls issue passports and visas,
register the births or deaths of nationals from their her home State in the re-
ceiving State, and deal with matters arising from contracts, wills, and deeds
between nationals of both the sending and the receiving States. Id. at 67-69.
The ability to celebrate marriages and act as a notary public represent two of
the consul's civil duties. Id. at 70-74. The protective function is the consul's
third primary civil duty. Id. at 76, 81.
27. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 35 (1986). Only sover-
eign States may exercise consular relations. Id. States establish consular rela-
tions only with the consent of the receiving State. Id. Prior to the 1960s, States
mandated specific written or oral bilateral agreements between them before un-
dertaking any consular activity. Id. at 32. Any other practice would have vio-
lated the receiving State's sovereignty. Id.
These numerous bilateral treaties often conflicted. See LEE, CONSULAR
LAw, supra note 1, at 18, 646-57. In response to this proliferation and the con-
flicting nature of bilateral treaties, several scholars attempted to promulgate
draft model codes on the legal position and fimction of consular representatives.
Id. at 18. European and American scholars first attempted drafts between 1868
and 1890, however, they produced highly academic material. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra, at 28 (describing the codes drafted by
Bluntschli, Field, and Fiore). The International Law Association law produced
more thorough codes in 1928 and 1932. Id.; see Draft Convention on Legal Posi-
tion and Functions of Consuls, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 189 (Supp. 1932) (summariz-
ing the Harvard research of 1932, with comment).
28. 2 OPPENHEim, supra note 23, § 535, at 1133; see supra note 26 and ac-
companying text (defining consul).
29. International law originates from several sources: customary interna-
tional law (opiniojuris), conventional international law (treaties), general prin-
ciples of law, judicial decisions, and scholarly opinion. THoMAs BUERGENTHAL,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 22-28 (2d ed. 1990); see also Statute
[Vol. 78:771778
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consular law derives primarily from two major multilateral trea-
ties,31 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 32 and the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.33 Together, these
instruments establish internationally accepted boundaries
within which nations conduct their diplomatic and consular
efforts.34
of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055,
1060, T.S. No. 993, at 30 (offering the same list). Consular law contains aspects
of diplomatic, political, commercial, maritime, and civil legal principles. LEE,
CONSULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 3. See generally PUEN E, supra note 26, at 57-
80 (detailing some of the duties of consuls and their domestic equivalents).
Early consuls existed to facilitate international trade: a sense of security and
confidence was extremely conducive to trade, travel, and residence abroad. See
generally NussmAum, supra note 23 (discussing the historical evolution of con-
sular representatives); STUART, supra note 23 (same).
30. At one time monarchs sent consuls abroad to facilitate trade and navi-
gation. LEE, CONSULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 3-5. During the Middle Ages,
consuls exercised a judicial function, primarily arbitrating commercial dis-
putes. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, § 534, at 1132. Eventually, because foreign
merchants were subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the State in
which they lived, consular authority devolved into "a general supervision of the
commerce and navigation of their home states, and to a kind of protection of the
commercial interests of their countrymen." 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 23, § 534,
at 1132-33.
31. The United Nations defines "treaty" as a "generic term covering all
forms of international agreement in writing concluded between states." United
Nations Reports of the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. IN'VL L. 248,
287 (1967); see infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing accession,
ratification and adherence to treaties).
32. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6.
33. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter Vienna Diplomatic Convention].
34. The U.S. State Department noted that the "Vienna Convention on Con-
sular Relations... is widely accepted as the standard of international practice
of civilized nations, whether or not they are parties to the Convention." LEE,
CONsULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 145 (citing State Department instructions di-
rected to the U.S. Embassy in Syria concerning imprisoned U.S. citizens). The
United States gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the Vienna Con-
sular Convention on October 22, 1969. 115 Cong. Rec. 30997 (1969).
The development of international law has long encompassed consular prin-
ciples. For a discussion of the integration of consuls and consular principles
into international law, see LEE, CoNSULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 5-17. As the
concept of consular activity developed, an increasing number of nations negoti-
ated consular treaties. See id. at Appendix I, 646-657 (listing modern consular
treaties). It is possible, on the basis of the significant integration of consular
and international law, to consider consular relations customary international
law. An international custom is "a general practice accepted as law." Statute of
the International Court of Justice, June 25, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 933. The "general and consistent practice of [Sitates" which those
States follow from a "sense of legal obligation" reflects customary international
law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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The Vienna Consular Convention guarantees and defines
consular rights,35 privileges,3 6 and duties 37 among the signatory
nations.38 After World War II, increased international recogni-
tion that consular law required codification initiated events
which resulted in the Convention. 39 The International Law
Commission sent a draft to the United Nations, which, in
1963,40 convened the International Conference on Consular Re-
lations in Vienna, Austria.41 This conference established the
35. The Vienna Consular Convention obligates signatory nations to accord
consuls certain personal rights including the inviolability of consular officials;
immunity from jurisdiction; exemption from taxation; and exemption from cus-
toms, duties, and inspection. See Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6,
arts. 21, 41-53; LEE, CONSULAR LAW, supra note 1, at 460-61. Sending States
regard these rights as central to the ability of the consul to effectively perform
his or her duties within the receiving State. Id. at 457. Thus, the Vienna Con-
sular Convention obligates receiving States to "treat consular officers with due
respect and ... take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person,
freedom or dignity." Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6, art. 40.
36. Consuls and consular posts enjoy numerous privileges in the receiving
state. These range from the basic, such as the ability to fly the flag of the home
State over the consular premises, to the crucial, such as the inviolability of
those premises. See Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6, arts. 29, 31, 21.
37. The duties of a consul vary tremendously. Article 5 of the Vienna Con-
sular Convention states that consular duties include: protecting the interests of
the sending State; furthering commercial, economic, cultural, and scientific re-
lations between the sending and receiving States; issuing passports and other
travel documents; performing civil functions, such as acting as a notary; safe-
guarding the interests of minors or persons with physical or mental disabilities
who are nationals of the home State; obtaining representation for nationals of
the home State in the receiving State; transmitting judicial or extra-judicial
letters (such as letters rogatory) and documents; supervising vessels of all kinds
and extending assistance to their crews; and other similar functions. Vienna
Consular Convention, supra note 6, art. 5, 21; see also supra note 26 and accom-
panying text (defining consuls).
38. Ninety-two States participated in the drafting of the Vienna Consular
Convention. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Consular Relations,
April 24, 1963, art. 3, 596 U.N.T.S. 458. [hereinafter Final Act]. In addition,
three States and four specialized agencies sent special observers to voice their
respective views during the drafting. Id. As of 1993, 50 States had signed and
144 States had become parties to the Vienna Consular Convention. See MULTi.
LATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUs AS AT 31
DECEMBER 1991, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/11, at 68-69 U.N. Sales No. E.92.v.4.
(1991) [hereinafter MuLTILATERAL TREATIEs].
39. LEE, CoNsULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 23. For a detailed description and
analysis of the formative process of the Vienna Consular Convention, see gener-
ally LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 23.
40. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 23, at 228 (citing U.N. GAOR,
16th Sess., Supp. No. 9, U.N. Doc. A/4843 (1962)).
41. See id. at 15 (citing G.A. Res. 1685, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No.
17, at 61, U.N. Doc. A/5100) (1962)).
The consular conference took place from March 4 to April 22, 1963. A total
of 92 states attended, 11 more than in the 1961 Conference. See Final Act,
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current Convention to which over 144 countries have become
parties.42
1. The Formation of Treaties
A long process of consensus building precedes the emer-
gence of any multilateral treaty.43 The Vienna Consular Con-
vention officially began with a resolution of the United Nations'
General Assembly which subsequently led to the treaty drafting
conference. 44 Once drafted, a treaty must become binding to ef-
fectuate its goal. Although a variety of means exist, treaties
generally "enter into force"4 5 through either ratification 46 or ac-
supra note 38, arts. 3-4. The nations attending adopted the Convention on Con-
sular Relations, which contained 79 articles. Id. art. 14. In addition, the Con-
ference adopted the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, the Optional Protocol concerning Acquisition of Nationality, and
other minor resolutions. Id. arts. 13-14. See generally LEE, VINNA CONVEN-
TION, supra note 23 (describing the formation of the Vienna Consular
Convention).
42. See supra note 38 (noting that 144 countries have become parties to the
Convention).
43. In contrast, bilateral and smaller multi-lateral treaties, such as those
which initially characterized consular law, begin in the foreign ministries of few
states. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 29, at 94; see also infra note 77 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Vienna Treaty Convention in the United States); cf Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 9, 10, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Treaty Convention] (entered into force Jan.
27, 1980) (discussing the two-thirds majority of parties present at an interna-
tional conference necessary for adoption of a treaty drafted at the conference).
44. See supra notes 4041 and accompanying text (discussing events pre-
paratory to the Vienna Consular Conference).
45. A term of art which indicates the "point in time at which a treaty be-
comes binding, as between the parties that have ratified or acceded to it. Multi-
lateral treaties usually specify a certain number of ratifications or accessions
for the agreement to come into force." Fox, supra note 7, at 130; see also RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 34, § 312 (1987) (defining "enter into force").
46. Article 11 of the Vienna Treaty Convention states that "[t]he consent of
a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or acces-
sion, or by any other means if so agreed." Vienna Treaty Convention, supra
note 43, art. 11. Many treaties provide that, once signed and ratified by a
number of States, they become "in force" and thus binding on those States
which have signed and ratified; for example, the Vienna Consular Convention,
Article 77 provides that "[tihe present Convention shall enter into force on the
thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of
ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Vi-
enna Consular Convention, supra note 6, art. 77(1).
A State which has signed a treaty may excuse itself from compliance with
its terms by means of a "reservation." Vienna Treaty Convention, supra note
43, art. 2(d); RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 313. During ratification, States
may express "reservations" about certain terms or effects of the treaty. A reser-
vation constitutes "a unilateral statement... purport[ing] to exclude or to mod-
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cession.47 Once a major multilateral treaty such as the Vienna
Consular Convention has been in effect for a certain length of
time, many States will consider it customary international
law.48 When this happens, participating States will expect even
States that have not ratified, signed, or acceded to abide by the
treaty obligations. 49
2. The Duty to Protect Fellow Nationals
Article 36 of the Vienna Consular Convention states inter
alia:
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relat-
ing to nationals of the sending State:
ify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State." Vienna Treaty Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(d). States attach reser-
vations when they wish to avoid conflict with domestic political or legal reali-
ties. See, e.g., MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 38, at 123-24, 132 (detailing
the reservations the United States made to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights to avoid limits on the right of the United States courts to
impose the death penalty). In the United States, the Executive may sign a
treaty, but must then present it to the Senate for ratification. U.S. CONsT. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2; RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 314(1). When it signed, the United
States made no reservations to the Vienna Consular Convention, but did object
to the reservations made by another State. MULTLATERAL TREATIES, supra note
38, at 68-69, 73.
47. Accession is a "process of becoming a party to, or legally bound by a
treaty without formal action, e.g., ratification and without substantial reserva-
tion." Fox, supra note 7, at 4. Four categories of States may adhere to the
Vienna Consular Convention: member States of the United Nations, member
States of any of the specialized agencies, parties to the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and any other States invited by the General Assembly to
accede to the Convention. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6, arts. 74,
76; LEE, CoNsULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 637. It does not matter how a State
becomes a party to a treaty; once it does, the effect is the same. Vienna Treaty
Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(b).
48. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the Vienna Con-
sular Convention as customary international law).
49. No firm length of time is agreed upon for this process. The United
States, one of the original signers of the Vienna Consular Convention, appears
to regard the obligations of the Convention to be customary international law.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (citing and discussing U.S. represen-
tations to the Government of Syria). On October 24, 1973, the U.S. State De-
partment observed that "the Vienna Convention contains obligations of the
highest order" and that it would follow closely situations in which nations failed
"to comply with existing international law standards as embodied in the Vienna
[Consular] Convention." ARTHUR W. RoVINE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1973, 161 (1973). Mr. J. Ed-
ward Lyerly, Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. State Department, also noted that the
United States considers the Vienna Consular Convention to be "entirely self-
executing", requiring no congressional implementing legislation. SEN. EXEC.
REP. No. 9, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., app., at 5 (1969) [hereinafter SEN. ExEc. REP.]
(statement of J. Edward Lyerly).
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(a) Consular officials shall be free to communicate with nationals
of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the send-
ing state shall have the same freedom with respect to communication
with and access to consular officers of the sending state.
(b) If he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be for-
warded by said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-
paragraph .... 50
Protecting the nationals of his or her sending State is one of
a consul's foremost duties.5 ' Aliens are subject to the territorial
50. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6, (emphasis added). The text
of the International Law Commission Draft Convention contained a version of
Article 36 which demanded without qualification that arresting authorities in-
form the appropriate consulate each and every time they arrested a foreign na-
tional. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 23, at 109. Many States, however,
were unwilling to accept such a principle. See 1 United Nations Conference on
Consular Relations: Official Records, at 340, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.25/16 (1963)
[hereinafter Consular Relations Off. Rec.] (statement of the Philippine delega-
tion that when an alien entered a foreign country, he accepted the jurisdiction
of its laws). Some States strongly contested the very existence of Article 36.
LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 23, at 107. The debate raised such ques-
tions as whether states would respect the requests of arrested individuals who
did not wish to involve their consulates and whether the administrative burden
of the measure would be too large. 1 Consular Relations Off. Rec., supra, at 35-
37, 331-32, 336-37 (statements of the Australian, Thai, Canadian, Japanese,
United Arab Republic, West Germany, Italian, Yugoslavian, Philippine, New
Zealand, Malayan, U.S.S.R., United States, Venezuelan, Vietnamese and Tuni-
sian delegations). The Soviet delegation expressed its concern as to how, on a
practical level, the Convention could enforce the rights of States to protect their
nationals. See id. at 37 (statement of the Soviet delegation). After much debate
and almost at the last minute, the group adopted the present text of Article 36.
LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 23, at 111-13. Pursuant to an amend-
ment from the British delegation, the group also added the requirement that
the competent authorities inform the national of his rights under Article 36
immediately upon arrest. 1 Consular Relations Off. Rec., supra, at 87.
51. In 1888, one distinguished commentator stated that it is "a consul's
duty to see that his nationals' rights are respected in a foreign land.... ." LEE,
CONSULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 124 (quoting G.H. STUART, AmRmCAN DIPLO-
MATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICE 372 (2d ed. 1955) (translating PAUL Louis ER-
NEST PRADIER-FOD9RP,, 4 TRAMT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 555 (1888)). In
1936, the United States noted that the consul's duty to protect is nonderogable.
Id. at 137 (citing communications between the then-acting Secretary of State
and then Ambassador to Peru). The Vienna Diplomatic Convention declares
that the consular protective function "consists inter alia in... protecting...
nationals [of the sending state]." Vienna Diplomatic Convention, supra note 33.
The duty to notify a consular post of the detention of one of its nationals
does not imply that consular authorities should behave passively in this protec-
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jurisdiction of the State they visit. They also remain, however,
under the protection of their home State.52 The home State's
protective power does not imply that an alien merits greater pro-
tection than the domestic law affords the local citizenry.53 In-
stead, the treaty provisions that embody this protective function
recognize that aliens face special difficulties in foreign legal sys-
tems which consular assistance can often ameliorate. 54
Many States instruct their consuls that a national's request
for the State's protective efforts'binds its consuls to render such
aid.5 5 Generally, the initial choice to seek that protection lies
with the arrested national.56 Given that no nation may abro-
gate its duty to inform consular authorities of a foreign na-
tional's arrest in certain circumstances, consular efforts within
the United States will often depend on the cooperation of state
and municipal law enforcement authorities.5 7 Absent such coop-
eration, disputes over whether an individual requested consular
notification or whether authorities informed an individual of the
right to seek notification are difficult to resolve.58
tive role. Most countries authorize their consuls to approach the competent au-
thorities in the receiving State for information and protest the derogation of
their nationals' rights or a lack of information. LEE, CONSULAR LAw, supra note
1, at 134-35 (giving British requirements of its consuls as an example).
52. See, e.g., Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6, art. 36 (providing
for communication between consuls and their nationals imprisoned in foreign
states); Vienna Diplomatic Convention, supra note 33, art. 3(1)(b) (providing for
international protection of a national by his or her home State).
53. LEE, CONSULAR LAW, supra note 1, at 130.
54. Id. at 145. Hence, a person able to communicate with and for the alien
should be available to facilitate the alien's interest in a speedy delivery of jus-
tice. Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter reinforce this position.
Read together, these provisions imply a multilateral acceptance of an interna-
tional legal obligation to "promote... universal respect for, and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all...." U.N. CHARTER art. 55; see
also LEE, CoNsULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 131 (discussing articles 55 and 56 of
the United Nations Charter).
55. LEE, CONsuLAR LAw, supra note 1, at 124. Oppenheim, however, main-
tained that States have no obligation to assist their nationals abroad. 1 OPPEN-
HEIm, supra note 23, § 410, at 934.
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the plenary dis-
cussion at the Vienna Conference on Consular Relations and the objections to
making consul notification obligatory).
57. See Consular Relations Off. Rec., supra note 50, at 337. The United
States defended this duty during the drafting process. These circumstances in-
cluded the arrest of a mentally impaired national, such as Faulder. See id.; see
also LEE, CoNsuLAR LAw, supra note 1, at 139 (noting the United States' posi-
tion that no country may disregard its obligations under certain circumstances
to inform sending States of the arrest of their nationals).
58. The Indian delegation initially raised the question of the need for local
cooperation. Consular Relations Off. Rec., supra note 50, at 339. The Norwe-
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B. CONSULAR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
Any analysis of international law in United States courts
must begin with the Supremacy Clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.5 9
1. The Federal Foreign Affairs Powers
The Supremacy Clause mandates that the appropriate au-
thorities treat international law as equal to domestic federal
law.60 Only the doctrine of self-executing treaties limits the ap-
plication of this principle to international treaties.61 Despite the
gian delegation confirmed this proposition. Id. at 340. In countries where local
authorities cooperated with foreign consular representatives, the Norwegian
consuls were able to assist many of their fellow nationals and help the local
authorities by facilitating the removal of foreign trouble-makers. Id. When lo-
cal authorities did not cooperate, they simply claimed that the arrested foreign
nationals desired no consular assistance, leaving the consuls hamstrung. Id.
59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
60. Id.; see, e.g., Whitney v. Robinson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the
Constitution a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation,
with an act of legislation."). The United States Supreme Court construes trea-
ties as contracts between sovereign nations. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243,253 (1984); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258, 271 (1890); Foster v. Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1828); see also
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: COMPOSED ORIGI-
NALLY FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF TIM UNITED STATES 109-11 (Philadelphia,
Parrish, Dunning & Mears 1853) ("Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is the
law of the Land. It differs from other laws only as it must have the consent of a
foreign nation, being but a contract with respect to that nation.").
The Supreme Court, however, has held that when a treaty conflicts with an
act of Congress, the congressional decision will prevail. See, e.g., The Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) ("The Constitution gives [a treaty] no
superiority over an Act of Congress ... ."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2nd Cir. 1945). Where Congress has not made its
intent clear, courts will assume that Congress did not intend to require viola-
tion of international law. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
61. RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 111 and cmt. h. Chief Justice John
Marshall first recognized the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties in 1828. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314 ("[W]hen the terms of
a stipulation [in a treaty] import a contract.., the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department... and the legislature must execute the
contract, before it can become a rule for the courts."). Self-executing treaties,
unlike non-self-executing treaties, do not require congressional implementing
legislation. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylten, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 244 (1796) (finding
treaty protecting British creditors to be self-executing). Today, Congress and
the courts determine the self-executing nature of treaties on a case-by-case ba-
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clause's apparently direct language, however, both state and
federal courts have long hesitated to enforce its mandate and to
decide cases on the basis of international legal principles.62
Moreover, state and municipal officials and courts at all levels
have long struggled to resolve problems implicating interna-
tional law without intruding on federal foreign policy efforts. 63
The power to conduct foreign affairs rests exclusively with the
federal government.64 States must abide by federal foreign pol-
icy measures, even when they encroach on areas in which the
state would otherwise have concurrent authority to legislate.65
sis. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 34, § 314 cmt. d; see also supra note 49 (not-
ing the self-executing nature of the Vienna Consular Convention).
62. See Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference In Foreign Affairs, 83 AM.
J. INe'L L. 805 (1989) (summarizing the difficulties involved in judicial defer-
ence or abstention in cases involving international law).
63. See, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court, 142 P.2d 297, 311 (Cal. 1943) (ex-
amining the relationship between the national government and the state gov-
ernments regarding principles of international law); People v. Leary, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (considering whether the violation of international
law in the seizure of a fugitive on foreign soil invalidates the state court's juris-
diction); Petroleos Mexicanos v. Paxson, 786 S.W.2d 97, 97-99 (Tex. Ct. App.
1990) (considering the immunity of a foreign nation in state court for claims
arising out of commercial activity).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942); Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Some historical authority suggests that the Founders
intended the foreign affairs powers to be the vocation of the federal govern-
ment. For a detailed discussion of this historical authority, see Louis HENmN,
CoNsTiorrONALIsM, DIEMocRAcY, AND FOREIGN AFFAis 18-43 (1990); see also
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304. The text of the Constitution, which precisely de-
nies certain powers to the states, bolsters this assertion. States may not, for
instance, enter into alliances with foreign States distinct from those entered
into by the federal government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Only the federal gov-
ernment can regulate in certain areas which affect or concern international af-
fairs, namely commerce among nations and immigration. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4.
In addition, the ability to conclude treaties, belongs only to organs of the federal
government, namely the President and the Senate. Id. art. II, § 2; see Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (quoting with approval Chief Justice John Marshall's
statement as a member of Congress that "[t]he President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign na-
tions"). Finally, states must obtain congressional consent before they may
enter into an international agreement, assess charges on imports or exports,
keep military forces, or engage in a war. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2-3.
65. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796). Various state courts have also recognized this
potentially conflicting overlap of state and federal authority. See, e.g., K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm., 381 A.2d 774,
778 (N.J. 1977) (holding that New Jersey "buy American" provisions did not
impermissibly interfere with the federal government's conduct of foreign af-
fairs); In re Kish, 246 A.2d 1, 8 (N.J. 1968) (examining whether state law gov-
erning inheritance of money or property by foreign nationals infringed upon the
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With regard to the right to consular protection, the federal gov-
ernment has exercised the foreign affairs power and displaced a
measure of traditional state autonomy in enforcing its substan-
tive law.6
6
2. Individuals in International Law and Treaty-Based Rights
The Supremacy Clause expressly declares that interna-
tional treaties bind the states to the same extent that they bind
the federal government.6 7 Historically, courts interpreted the
Supremacy Clause to deny individuals standing to press claims
under such treaties.68 This traditional view holds that individu-
federal government's exclusive foreign relations power); N.Y. Times Co. v. City
of New York Comm'r on Human Rights, 361 N.E.2d 963, 969 (N.Y. 1977) (hold-
ing that city Commission on Human Rights cannot enforce boycott of South
Africa).
66. The federal government set forth its policy in Department of Justice
and Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") regulations. One such
INS regulation provides that "[elvery detained alien shall be notified that he
may communicate with the consular or diplomatic officers of the country of his
nationality in the United States." 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(G) (1993). With specific re-
gard to Canada, the regulation states that "[e]xisting treaties require immedi-
ate communication with the appropriate . . . officers whenever [Canadian
nationals] are detained in exclusion or expulsion proceedings whether or not
requested by the alien, and, in fact, even if the alien requests that no communica-
tion be undertaken on his behalf." Id. (emphasis added).
The Department of Justice also developed a firm procedure for guarantee-
ing Article 36 rights to the foreign nationals whom it arrests. 28 C.F.R.
§ 50.5(a) (1993). Designed to "establish a uniform procedure for consular notifi-
cation," the regulation requires that an officer arresting a foreign national in-
form that national of his or her right to notify the appropriate consular
authorities. Id. If the arrested person does not desire notification, no notifica-
tion will take place unless an effective treaty between the United States and
the person's home State requires notification regardless of the national's
wishes. Id. § 50.5(a)(1).
67. See supra text accompanying note 59 (quoting the Supremacy Clause).
68. In one of the first cases in which an American court examined a treaty
provision, the Supreme Court declared that individuals could enforce a treaty
when it "prescribe[d] a rule by which the rights of... private citizens... may
be determined." The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). Alter
that decision, United States courts have often held that an individual gains the
right to seek enforcement of a treaty provision only when that treaty expressly
confers a right to individuals. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d
1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) (ruling that treaty must "directly accord[ ] enforcea-
ble rights"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1295 (1992); Committee of U.S. Citizens
Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (requiring
treaty to "confer rights on private individuals"). United States courts have also
often ruled that treaties establish only the legal obligations and rights of the
States party to them. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259
(7th Cir.) (holding that defendant lacked standing to raise treaties as a chal-
lenge to court's jurisdiction because the "offended nation" did not protest his
detention), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. Zabaneh, 837
1994]
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als are the objects, rather than the subjects, of international
law.69 Recently, however, the notion that treaties create indi-
vidually enforceable rights has gained credence.70 Although
scholars continue to debate this question,71 the former view is
currently in decline,72 and the view that individuals comprise
international law's proper subjects has grown in prominence. 73
Correspondingly, courts in the United States disagree about
F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32,
37-38 (1st Cir. 1981) (same).
In United States v. Vertigo-Urquidez, the Ninth Circuit ruled that when a
nation protests a treaty violation which harms individual citizens of that na-
tion, the individuals gain "derivative standing" to protest the violation in
United States courts. 939 F.2d 1341, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991). In a related case,
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, however, the Supreme Court stated that "a
court must enforce [a self-executing treaty] on behalf of an individual." 112 S.
Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992).
69. Under a traditional conception of international law, States alone may
claim the benefits of international legal precepts. This approach stems from
traditional views on the absolute nature of state sovereignty. See MANUEL R.
GAncl-MoRA, LNTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 7 (1956). A
subject of international law possesses an international legal persona; it pos-
sesses rights and duties and may operate on the same level as other subjects of
international law. Usually, States comprise the sole subjects of international
law and, although individuals may be beneficiaries of international law, it has
not historically applied to them. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw 58-70 (4th ed. 1990); D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 115-17
(2d ed. 1976).
70. One scholar has suggested that the Framers intended, through the
Supremacy Clause, to enable individuals to enforce treaties in United States
courts. Carlos M. Vbzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1084 (1992). Professor V.zquez posited that the
Supremacy Clause should "be read to entitle individuals in our courts to such
remedies for treaty violations as would prevent or cure a violation by the
United States of its international law obligations to the state of the individual's
nationality." Id. at 1085-86. He theorized that if a treaty imposes judicially
cognizable and enforceable obligations, and the individual has both standing to
invoke enforcement and a right of action, then domestic courts must enforce
treaties. Id. at 1084. He further posited that an assumption that the
Supremacy Clause "was adopted in part to prevent or cure violations of interna-
tional law by the United States before they gave rise to international friction"
underpins this proposition. Id. at 1161-62.
71. The exact position of individuals under international law occupies a
great deal of scholarly debate. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889
(1983); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Do-
mestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 (1990); V.zquez, supra
note 70.
72. Karen Parker & Lyn B. Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of
Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & Com. L. REV. 411, 422 (1989).
73. See GARCI-MoRA, supra note 69, at 13-14; GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAw
AMONG NATIONS 185 (6th rev. ed. 1992); 1 Oppenheim, supra note 23, at 16.
VIENNA CONVENTION PRIVILEGES
the effect of international treaties on individual rights. 74
Although the courts have clearly established that treaties con-
stitute part of United States domestic law,7 5 they have encoun-
tered difficulty putting this principle into practice.7 6 When
interpreting a treaty,77 a court could view the instrument as
conveying to individuals only those rights and obligations specif-
ically enumerated therein. Under this view, if the treaty fails to
explicitly grant the individual the power to enforce its provi-
sions, a court will hold that the individual lacks standing to con-
test denial or abrogation of those provisions.78 Conversely, a
court might take a broader view of the treaty. For instance, a
court could view treaties as conveying comprehensive rights and
obligations to the populace of signatory nations; in turn, individ-
ual enforcement of a particular provision would become a means
of ensuring the nation's compliance.
C. THE RIGHTS OF FoREIGN CITIzENS IN THE UNITED STATES
Among all domestic legal provisions in the United States
immigration laws most directly affect aliens. Congress enjoys
almost absolute power over immigration,79 and courts have been
74. See also supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing when indi-
viduals have standing to enforce treaties).
75. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the status of trea-
ties in U.S. domestic law).
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the construction
of treaties by United States courts).
77. To interpret treaties and determine the rights and obligations arising
under them, most nations would look to the treaty itself and would be guided in
their interpretation by the Vienna Treaty Convention. See Vienna Treaty Con-
vention, supra note 43. Although the United States is a signatory of the Vienna
Treaty Convention, the Senate has not ratified it. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, United States
courts regularly employ the Vienna Treaty Convention as an interpretive tool.
See, e.g., Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d at 1362-63 (Refugee
Convention); Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 36 (2nd Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (Warsaw Convention). A multilateral conven-
tion, the Vienna Treaty Convention directs interpreters to apply a treaty's plain
language with reference to its "ordinary meaning" in its particular context and
"in light of their object and purpose." Vienna Treaty Convention, supra note 43,
art. 31(1). U.S. courts have interpreted treaties in a similar fashion. United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1991) (finding plain language of
extradition treaty did not mention kidnapping); United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989).
78. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (collecting cases holding that
a treaty must explicitly grant individual some enforcement power).
79. Congress derives its power to regulate immigration from several
sources. The Constitution gives broad powers to exclude from entry, expel after
entry, and naturalize aliens. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Supreme Court
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extremely reluctant to disturb this power.80 Hence, as a practi-
cal matter, Congress can discriminate as it chooses when formu-
lating immigration policy to effectuate foreign policy.8 '
Conversely, states possess no power over immigration8 2 or for-
eign policy.8 3 This state incapacity does not, however, guaran-
tee that resident aliens84 will not face discriminatory state
has traditionally found Congress's power to exclude and expel derives from the
foreign commerce power as an incident of the national sovereignty.
In The Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court noted that the federal power to
exclude non-nationals was an incident of national sovereignty. 130 U.S. 581,
603-04 (1889). Reasoning that each government possessed the inherent author-
ity to supervise matters of concern to the national public, the court consideredimmigration to be a matter of vital national security and concern. Id. at 606;
see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (dis-
tinguishing between delegated powers and inherent sovereign powers).
The federal government's complete power over foreign affairs constitutes
another source of federal power over aliens. See, e.g., Fon Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581.
80. Courts will still review congressional decisions in certain very specific
areas of immigration and alien policy. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421 (1987) (asylum); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (exclusion deci-
sions); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) (deportation of resident aliens).
81. Congress enjoys complete freedom to discriminate in immigration mat-
ters. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (allowing Congress to establish a "Rule of
Naturalization"); see Fiallo, 430 U.S. 787; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889). Currently, a congressionally-designed system excludes, among
others, persons with political beliefs, moral character, or disabilities, which
Congress deems undesirable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1988).
Congress has broadly and inconsistently discriminated against aliens.
ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 3 (1985). Laws passed in 1892 and
in 1927 excluded half of the world's population from immigration to the United
States. Id. at 3-4. In 1980, however, Congress promulgated one of the most
liberal refugee admissions policies ever. Id. Today, public support apparently
weighs against increased or even sustained immigration. Americans, some
commentators argue, suffer from "[ciompassion fatigue." Id. at 4 (citations
omitted). See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting increased public
concern and debate over immigration issues).
82. The mere existence of federal primacy in immigration matters does not
automatically invalidate state legislation concerning aliens. See De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). States may not, however, intrude upon an area occu-
pied by federal legislation. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)
(holding Federal Alien Registration Act preempted state statute mandating re-
gistration of aliens); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (holding invalid a state
statute restricting employment of aliens).
83. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). In Zschernig, the Court
struck down an Oregon probate law which mandated a judicial inquiry into the
status of political rights in foreign countries before allowing the estates of
United States citizens to pass to foreign heirs. Id. Although the state regula-
tion had only an indirect effect on foreign policy, the Court held that even indi-
rect effects are the province of the federal government. Id. at 433.
84. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (defining "aliens").
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legislation.8 5 States retain their other powers, such as general
police powers, and may use these powers to discriminate against
aliens in certain circumstances.8 6
The Constitution, however, imposes certain limits on state
and congressional control over aliens. Although many impor-
tant constitutional provisions refer to "citizens" instead of "per-
sons,"8 7 the Constitution also guarantees to resident aliens
many common protections available to citizens.88 The rights
which aliens enjoy include the rights of free speech,8 9 freedom of
85. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). "[This] Court has never held
that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of
immigration and thus per se pre-empted by [the federal immigration power]."
Id. at 355. In fact, state discrimination against aliens has an extensive history.
See, e.g., Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (limiting to citizens the abil-
ity to acquire a license to operate a pool hall); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175
(1915) (holding that states may bar aliens from public employment); Patsone v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (holding that states may bar aliens from
hunting and carrying firearms).
86. For instance, in New York, only citizens may become state troopers.
See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). Additionally, New York permits
resident aliens to become permanently certified as teachers only if they declare
an intention to become citizens. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
87. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. iv, sec. 2 (entitling citizens of each state to
the privileges and immunities of the several states); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (defin-
ing citizens of the United States), id. amend. XV (forbidding the abridgement of
a citizen's right to vote because of race), id. amend. XIX (forbidding the abridge-
ment of a citizen's right to vote on the basis of sex). See supra note 7 and accom-
panying text (defining "aliens").
88. An alien seems entitled to all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights not
specifically reserved for citizens. See, e.g., U.S. CONST., amend. I (providing no
limitation on First Amendment freedoms); id. amend. VI (limiting the Fifth
Amendment only to "the accused"); cf id., amend. X=V (referring to "citizens").
In 1886, for instance, the Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons within the country. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In 1948, an alien successfully challenged a Cali-
fornia law preventing aliens from acquiring fishing licenses, clearly abrogating
the states' ability to discriminate openly on the basis of alienage. Takahashi v.
Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410,419 (1948). The Supreme Court fur-
ther held in 1971 that aliens constituted a specific minority deserving of en-
hanced judicial protection, making alienage a suspect classification under the
Equal Protection Clause. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377 (1971).
In several subsequent cases, the Court struck down a number of ordinances
discriminating on the basis of alienage. See, e.g., Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S.
216 (1984) (notaries public); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (attending
school); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (practice of law); Sugarman v. Dou-
gall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (civil service employment).
89. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); cf Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (aliens may be excluded for views held or opinions
expressed).
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religion, and various criminal procedural protections.90
II. RATIONALES FOR EFFECTIVE DOMESTIC
ENFORCEMENT OF THE VIENNA CONSULAR
CONVENTION
The issues surrounding individual treaty-based rights and
the enforcement of consular treaty provisions present relatively
new questions for United States courts and for state and munici-
pal governments. State and municipal governments should ef-
fect changes in the procedures for dealing with an arrested
foreign national for three reasons: the United States should en-
courage reciprocal action regarding its citizens arrested abroad,
the federal government has promulgated a straightforward pol-
icy regarding the Vienna Consular Convention, and the judici-
ary has acknowledged this policy and enforced the provisions of
the treaty.
A. RECIPRocITy
In the international relations context, reciprocity serves as
the golden rule.9 ' It holds that if one State abides by the inter-
national rules to which it has agreed, then other States should
abide as well.92 To the extent international law strives for sta-
bility and order, reciprocity demands mutual forbearance from
deviation from the precepts of international law.93 Moreover,
absent a police force to enforce international agreements, com-
pliance becomes a function of the shared expectation that other
States will abide by their promises. Each State must weigh the
risk of noncompliance against the retaliatory effect of noncom-
pliance by other States.
Article 36 of the Vienna Consular Convention recognizes a
90. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing rights that the
Constitution guarantees to aliens).
91. The Golden Rule states that one should do unto others as you would
have them do unto you. See Luke 6:31; Matthew 7:12; 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BMrTAN.
NicA 656 (15th ed. 1989) (discussing Confucius); WEBSTER'S NEW INERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 975 (3d ed. 1986).
92. Hilton v. Guyot provides a classic, albeit unfortunate, illustration of
reciprocity. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). The Supreme Court denied private litigants
enforcement of a French judgment in their favor because France would not en-
force a foreign judgment. Id. at 227-28. The Supreme Court more recently has
disapproved retaliatory judicial diplomacy of this kind. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding courts cannot scrutinize the
legality of acts of foreign states because such scrutiny could interfere with the
executive's conduct of foreign affairs).
93. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953).
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broadly accepted right to consular protection and notification.94
Many nations, including the United States, regularly employ
these principles on their citizens' behalf. According to the State
Department, Article 36 obligations are "of the highest order and
[should not be] dealt with lightly."95 The State Department de-
mands that other nations respect Article 36's mandate. In 1975,
for instance, Syrian security authorities detained two United
States nationals.96 The Syrians neither allowed the two to no-
tify the American embassy nor informed the embassy of their
arrest.97 The Department told Syrian authorities that "if [Syr-
ian] nationals were detained in the United States the appropri-
ate Syrian offices would be promptly notified and allowed
prompt access to those nationals."98 Four months later, U.S. of-
ficials visited the two detainees. 99
The U.S. government recognized early the importance of
reciprocity,' 00 as the Department of State stressed in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "The United
States Government has to consider the Vienna Convention on
94. Although Article 36 of the Vienna Consular Convention supplies the
principal source for the right to consular protection, other international instru-
ments contain similar provisions. See, e.g., Vienna Diplomatic Convention,
supra note 33, art 3(b), 45(c); see also Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, principle 16(2), G.A.
Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 297, U.N. Doc AIRES/43/
173 (1989), reprinted in CEN=RE FOR HumN RIGHTS, UNITsD NATIONS, Hum'N
RIGHTS: A COIPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL NSTRUMENTS at 265-74, U.N. Doc.
ST/HR/1/REV.4, U.N. Sales No. E.93.XIV.1 (1993) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
INSTRUmmENs] ("If a detained or imprisoned person is a foreigner, he shall.., be
promptly informed of his right to communicate... with a consular post....");
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Art. 38(1), E.S.C.
Res. 663(c), U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1 at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048
(1957), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INsTRUMENTs, supra, at 243-62 ("Prisoners
who are foreign nationals shall be allowed reasonable facilities to communicate
with the diplomatic and consular representatives of the state to which they
belong.").
95. RovnE, supra note 49, at 161. When submitting the Vienna Consular
Convention to the President for his signature, William P. Rogers of the State
Department wrote that the Convention "requires that authorities of the receiv-
ing state inform the person detained of his right to have ... his detention re-
ported to the consular post concerned... [and that] [i]f he so requests, the
consular post shall be notified without delay." William P. Rogers, U.S. Dept. of
State, Letter of Submittal, Apr. 18, 1969, reprinted in SEN. ExEc. REP., supra
note 49, at vi.
96. LEE, CONsuLAR LAw, supra note 1, at 145.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 146.
100. Id. at 145 (quoting United States government representations to
Syria).
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Consular Relations both from the viewpoint of the United States
as sending State and from the viewpoint of the United States as
receiving State."10 1 When presenting the Vienna Consular Con-
vention to the Senate for ratification, Senator Fulbright, the
Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, also recognized
the importance of reciprocity in the observance of the Conven-
tion's terms.'0 2
The reciprocity principle counsels that the United States
should honor consular treaty rights for aliens arrested domesti-
cally. It is only a matter of time before a nation decides to retali-
ate for maltreatment of one of its nationals by the United
States.10 3 Both the Canadian and Mexican governments sub-
mitted briefs amicus curiae in recent cases involving their na-
tionals requesting that the United States respect individual
defendants' international treaty-based rights.10 4 If the United
States continues to insist that other States abide by the Vienna
Consular Convention for the benefit of its citizenry arrested
abroad, then compliance must begin at home.
B. FEDERAL OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD
The power of the federal executive is at its "maximum" in
the area of consular protection because the Congress and the Ex-
ecutive agree in principle and, accordingly, act in tandem.'0 5 Af-
ter Senate ratification, the Executive, in the form of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Department of
Justice, issued regulations implementing certain provisions of
the Convention, including Article 36.106 These coordinated ac-
101. SEN. ExEc. REP., supra note 49, at 8.
102. 115 Cong. Rec. 30953 (1969) (statement of Sen. Fulbright) ("[Tihe Vi-
enna [Consular] Convention... spells out the privileges and immunities of con-
sular posts and their officers in the United States [and] guarantees them to our
vast consular establishment overseas.").
103. A recent incident involving a Mexican doctor kidnapped by the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration provides a pertinent example of the
negative reaction to the United States' disregard for applicable international
principles. See Daniel Williams, U.S. and Mexico Plan Talks on Extradition;
End to Abduction of Criminal Suspects Sought, WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at
A15. A second kidnapping incident provoked an "energetic protest" by Mexico.
Mexico Protests To U.S. In New Kidnap Case, REUTERS, June 18, 1992.
104. Canadian Amicus Brief, supra note 6; Brief ofAmicus Curiae, the Gov-
ernment of the United Mexican States, Supporting the Applicant, Ex Parte
Guerre, (No. 359805) (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
105. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
106. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing the INS and De-
partment of Justice regulations).
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tions indicate a federal occupation of the field 107 regarding a
treaty-based right to consular protection and thereby completely
preempt the states from contrary action.' 08
Because federal authority in international affairs ap-
proaches the absolute,' 0 9 states may not directly or indirectly
violate a clear national policy in this area."z0 The United States
established a national foreign policy regarding consular protec-
tion when the President signed and the Senate ratified the Vi-
enna Consular Convention."' Moreover, each time the United
States invokes the Vienna Consular Convention on behalf of one
of its citizens, it demonstrates a firm policy of observing the Con-
vention. States may not act in any manner that would aggra-
vate relations between the United States and a foreign State.
11 2
Even if there is no apparent contradiction between a state's ac-
tions and an international agreement, the state may not act in
any manner that conflicts with such an agreement in prac-
tice. 13 A state, thus, may not act so as to deny a foreign citizen
his or her right to consular protection.
The issues surrounding the right to consular protection be-
long under federal control for several additional reasons. A
state's limited constituency does not provide an appropriate
107. The courts have found that Congress has preempted state regulation
when an "Act of Congress [touches] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject." See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (citations
omitted).
108. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). ("A
state law also is pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which the fed-
eral statute was designed to reach [its] goal."); see also United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) (noting that states have no power to
negotiate with foreign countries).
109. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing federal pri-
macy in foreign affairs).
110. See supra notes 64, 65 and 108 and accompanying text (describing fed-
eral preemption of state law).
111. See supra note 34 (discussing senate ratification of the Vienna Consu-
lar Convention).
112. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The
Court considered whether federal or state law ought to control the application
of the "Act of State" doctrine, which commands every State to respect the sover-
eign acts of every other State, in a federal diversity case. Id. at 421. Having
decided that the doctrine was "uniquely federal," the Court also noted that state
courts were not "free to formulate their own rules" in this area because state
rules would undermine the purposes of the doctrine. Id. at 424.
113. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (holding that Oregon law
which forbade "inheritance of property by an alien living in a foreign country"
interefered with United States-Yugoslavian agreements).
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political context in which to make the required policy judgment
regarding the treaty-based rights of aliens. Under the United
States Constitution and the Vienna Treaty Convention, individ-
ual states may not make alliances with foreign powers nor nego-
tiate or enter into treaties." 4 As a result, states lack the
international political experience to make policy judgments
about aliens. The political arena of a state is the domestic af-
fairs of state, not international relations.
A state may promulgate general policies that affect the
treatment of aliens within its borders. 115 A question arises,
however, whether the state decision maker has access to the
pertinent information necessary to make a considered decision
regarding issues affecting aliens. Because states do not interact
on the international level, they cannot adequately judge how
their actions may affect the broader federal interests at stake.
For instance, an individual state that arrests an East European
national is unlikely to be aware that the United States consist-
ently demands that the national's home State adhere to the Vi-
enna Consular Convention when it arrests Americans there.
Individual states are therefore ill-equipped to assess the conse-
quences of their actions regarding the right to consular
protection.116
The consequences of states' policies regarding aliens within
their borders may, therefore, adversely affect the entire nation.
If a state arrests a foreign national and fails to accord her the
appropriate choice of consular notification, the federal govern-
ment ultimately bears the responsibility to the foreign power ag-
grieved by the state's actions. 117 As a result, it is the federal
efforts on behalf of Americans abroad that will likely suffer, not
the state's efforts to punish the alien it arrested.
114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 1 (no state may enter into a treaty); Vienna
Treaty Convention, supra note 43, art. 2 (a), (e), & (f) (defining treaties, con-
tracting States and negotiating States).
115. See supra note 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing general state
powers and aliens).
116. This is a simple example. A further example of a state's incapacity to
deal with the foreign nationals it arrests occurred recently in Florida. Nature's
Call Mistaken for Bomb Threat, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1993, at C23. A German
student spent nine months in jail for asking to use the bathroom on a plane. Id.
Apparently, the inebriated student translated a German slang expression into
English when making his request. Id. The slang expression sounded like a
bomb threat to the airline officials. Id. A consular official might have amelio-
rated the misunderstanding before it wasted valuable court time.
117. See infra part III.C and accompanying text (regarding diplomatic notes
addressed to the United States from Canada and Mexico regarding treatment of




Some courts have recognized the treaty-based right to con-
sular protection. The first significant example of an alien at-
tempting to nullify legal proceedings against him because
authorities initially denied him the right to consular protection
occurred in Italy."" In that case the Italian court ruled that
consular assistance was merely "complementary" to other legal
protections and, finding that the defendant had adequately de-
fended himself, denied the appeal. 119
In contrast, United States courts have held that an individ-
ual may seek redress for the denial of rights derived from the
Vienna Consular Convention. In United States v. Calderon-Me-
dina, °20 a 1979 case involving a Mexican national indicted for
illegal reentry into the United States, the Ninth Circuit con-
strued the INS regulation implementing Article 36 of the Vienna
Consular Convention. 121 The court specifically found that the
INS intended the regulation to fulfill the United States' obliga-
tions under the Convention.122 The court employed a two-part
test to determine whether the deportees had met their burden of
demonstrating that the government's noncompliance with the
regulation should invalidate the conviction. 12 3 Under this test,
the alien must first show that the regulation serves a purpose
generally beneficial to the alien and, in addition, the alien must
show that the violation prejudiced his interests protected by the
regulation.124
In the companion case of Rangel-Gonzales, the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed a conviction because the defendant presented evi-
dence that, had he known of his right to contact his consulate, he
would have done so and that the consulate would then have ren-
dered all possible assistance. 125 Faced with such evidence,
12 6
118. Italian authorities arrested a British national on criminal charges and
failed to notify the British consulate of the arrest or the subsequent proceedings
against its national. 2 ITALiAN Y.B. OF INTL L. 336 (1976).
119. Id. at 337.
120. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
121. This case represented the consolidated appeals of two defendants who
were Mexican citizens and who had been previously deported. Id. at 530. The
district courts had concluded in both cases that the deportation proceedings had
violated INS regulations implementing Article 36 of the Vienna Consular Con-
vention. Id. at 530.
122. Id. at 531 n.6.
123. Id. at 531-32.
124. Id; see also United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 530 (9th
Cir. 1980).
125. Id. at 531.
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the court held that the defendant had sufficiently demonstrated
that the violation prejudiced his defense. 127 The court held that
only a showing of actual prejudice resulting from a violation of
the regulation will merit reversal of a conviction. 128
Although most courts have yet to address this issue, the
Ninth Circuit has taken the view that the right to consular pro-
tection is of considerable importance to aliens arrested within
the United States.129 Judicial recognition of actual prejudice
strongly supports the notion that states must respect a defend-
ant's rights under the Vienna Consular Convention. Calderon-
Medina and Rangel-Gonzales offer a positive framework for judi-
cial review of the denial of consular protection.
III. ENHANCING CONSULAR PROTECTION: A
PROPOSAL
The participants of the Vienna Conference on Consular Re-
lations did not expressly state that aliens would have the right
to appeal the denial of their treaty-based rights.13 0 Instead,
they sought to define the boundaries of consular activity, not the
126. The evidence included affidavits from the defendant that he would
have sought notification and from the local Mexican consul that he would have
rendered aid. Id.
127. Id. at 532-33.
128. To show actual prejudice, aliens must "demonstrate prejudice resulting
from the INS regulation violations [that] ... harmed the aliens' interests in
such a way as to affect potentially the outcome of their deportation proceed-
ings." Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 532.
In another case in which the defendant did not successfully demonstrate
prejudice, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction. United States v. Vega-
Mejia, 611 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The court noted that the de-
fendant's "main concern" was to return to Mexico as quickly as possible. Id. at
752. Because speaking with his consul would have delayed the defendant's de-
parture, the defendant suffered no prejudice. Id.
129. See Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 532 ("The right established by the
regulation and in this case by the treaty is a personal one.").
130. During the drafting conference, the delegates were mostly concerned
with the obligation of the receiving State to "permit unimpeded communication
between consuls and nationals of the sending state, to inform consuls of the
imprisonment or detention within their district of such nationals, and to allow
consuls to visit them in prison, custody or detention." LEE, VIENNA CONVEN-
TION, supra note 23, at 107. The Italian delegation voiced concern that consuls
would be implicitly prevented from performing their protective function unless
notified of the arrest of their nationals. 1 Consular Relations Off. Rec., supra
note 50, at 338. All the participants, however, seemed committed to the "right
of every state to protect its nationals." LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note
23, at 112-13.
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ensuing domestic legal ramifications. 131 They did intend to en-
sure that an arrested alien enjoyed the benefit of consular pro-
tection, if he or she so desired it.132 Nonetheless, the
participants left it to the individual States to determine how
best to enforce that right.133 The important international impli-
cations of domestic enforcement and the chance that a single
state will disregard the right to consular protection demand a
unified approach to enforcement in the United States. As the
federal government has developed a clear and decisive approach
to consular protection, states should follow this lead.
Any proposed effort to guarantee arrested aliens their Vi-
enna Consular Convention rights must be sensitive to both the
realities of law enforcement in the United States and the desires
of the individual aliens involved in the process. This Note pro-
poses that state and local authorities adopt a process of stan-
dard warnings to inform aliens of their right to consular
protection.'3 4 Such a system would protect both an alien's right
to consular protection and his right not to seek such protection,
if he wishes. Moreover, this Note asserts that for this right to be
viable, aliens must be granted standing to enforce it against lo-
cal authorities.
A. NOTIFICATION OF THE mALIEN
Local authorities routinely determine the nationality of
those they arrest 135 to ascertain past criminal or penal histories,
the existence of outstanding warrants, and the possible interest
of other jurisdictions in the detainee.'3 6 Thus, when implement-
ing the notification requirement, law enforcement agencies need
only expend a slight additional effort to notify the defendant,
131. LEE, VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 23, at 107 (describing the efforts
made to retain Article 36 in the final document).
132. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 6, art. 36(1)(b).
133. Article 36 contains no reference to domestic enforcement of its provi-
sions. Id. art. 36(2).
134. The authorities should give these warnings after arresting the alien
and determining his or her nationality. Obviously, it would make no sense to
require police officers to attempt to ascertain the nationality of every individual
at the time of arrest. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that
the Constitution requires police officers to inform arrestees of their constitu-
tional rights before questioning).
135. See, e.g., Texas Attorney General's Letters, supra note 4.
136. Id. See generally James R.E. Younger, Investigating Problems Involv-
ing Foreign Nationals, in TRANSCoNTnIENTAL CmIE: INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSES
(Harold E. Smith ed., 1989) (discussing mutual legal assistance treaties be-
tween the United States and Switzerland, Turkey, the Netherlands and Italy).
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orally and in writing, in a language he understands, of his right
to seek consular protection. If the alien so desires, the authori-
ties should inform the appropriate consulate without delay. 137
Under this Note's proposal, the detainee's refusal to seek consu-
lar protection would constitute waiver of his treaty-based
rights. 138
This proposal has the benefit of being simple and easy to
implement. The United States State Department makes the in-
formation for training arresting officers and other relevant per-
sonnel in the Vienna Convention's requirements readily
available. 139 States may not object that the need for warnings to
ensure the guarantee of consular protection is more properly a
matter for the federal government. Because criminal law com-
prises an area of concurrent authority, federal primacy in the
foreign affairs field does not prevent concurrent state regulation
of alien criminal activity.140 Rather, states should follow federal
guidance embodied in the regulations of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Department of Justice, which
substantially comport with the requirements of the Vienna Con-
sular Convention.141
Both detainees and local authorities would benefit from this
routine practice. Detainees would be in a better position to
make informed decisions regarding their defense. State and mu-
nicipal authorities could seek the assistance of consular authori-
ties in learning about the detainee's criminal and penal history
and relevant physical and mental characteristics.142
137. See LEE, CONSULAR LAw, supra note 1, at 143. According to the State
Department, the Vienna Conference requires notification "without delay... It
is the Department's view that such notification should take place as quickly as
possible and, in any event, no later than the passage of a few days." RovINE,
supra note 49, at 161.
138. Of course, detainees could still obtain consular help later if they so de-
sired. Consular representatives are bound by the instructions from their State
to help protect nationals. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (describing
consular duties). Therefore, if a defendant decided at a later date to seek consu-
lar protection, he or she need only ask his or her lawyer to contact the nearest
consular office.
139. See, e.g., BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAiRS, supra note 12; LEE, CONSULAR
LAW, supra note 1, at 164; MARLIN NASH LEIGH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 360-76 (1980).
140. See supra part I.C (discussing general state powers and federal regula-
tion of aliens).
141. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (describing federal regula-
tions implementing Article 36).
142. See supra text accompanying note 136 (noting how law enforcement au-




Any effort towards enforcing the right to consular protection
will require judicial supervision. Although courts may be reluc-
tant to apply international legal precepts, they do not hesitate to
protect the rights of individual defendants against the law en-
forcement practices of the states.143 When a state has arrested
an alien unfamiliar with a foreign legal system, the need for ju-
dicial weight to balance the interests involved assumes great im-
portance. Judicial enforcement, however, requires an
appropriate standard of review for claims of inadequate or non-
existent notification of the right to consular protection.
Courts should, in the first instance, act to ensure the ade-
quate delivery of consular services by providing the alien with
necessary information regarding consular protection when he or
she appears at the preliminary hearing and arraignment. If,
however, an alien receives inadequate notice and conviction re-
sults, then the alien would have grounds for and should appeal
his conviction. The reviewing court should employ the two-part
test the Ninth Circuit developed in Calderon-Medina.14 4 The
first part of the test will almost always be met: any law or regu-
lation codifying the principles of the Vienna Consular Conven-
tion serves to benefit the alien. In the second part of the test,
the alien must demonstrate either the usefulness of consular aid
or that the abrogation of the applicable law or regulation, such
as the denial of the rights guaranteed by the Vienna Consular
Convention, harmed him. Designed to specifically encompass
the denial of the consular protection right, this simple and
straightforward test provides the defendant with the ability to
demonstrate that particular circumstances, such as his alienage,
language disability, or lack of sufficient understanding of the
legal proceedings against him, harmed his defense sufficiently to
merit reversal. 145
The necessity of judicial review becomes clear with an ex-
amination of the current "system" for guaranteeing delivery of
consular protection to aliens in the United States. Currently, no
domestic procedure exists for redress of a denial of the right to
143. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (protecting against
self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (protecting against un-
reasonable search and seizure).
144. See supra part I.C (discussing judicial recognition of aliens rights
under the Vienna Consular Convention and the Calderon-Medina test).
145. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text (discussing Faulder's disa-
bilities and their possible use at his trial).
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consular protection. A formal protest by the home State yields
the sole avenue of redress to an injured alien. This protest, how-
ever, involves a long and complicated process which would only
add to the confusion and repetition congesting the courts in the
United States. Individual enforcement of this treaty-based right
would significantly reduce the need for the burdensome process
of formal protest.
C. APPLICATION OF THIS PROPOSAL TO THE FAULDER CASE
Texas authorities never notified Faulder of his right to seek
consular protection. Moreover, Faulder's unique circumstances,
caused by his mental deficiencies, reflect precisely the type of
situation foreseen by the United States delegation to the Vienna
Conference: namely, situations in which the detainee's consu-
late should receive automatic notification of his arrest.146 Had
Texas authorities notified the consulate, it would have visited
Faulder and sought to help him understand the charges facing
him. The consulate would also have endeavored to assist
Faulder's defense attorney in locating mitigating evidence in
Canada. Perhaps most importantly, the consulate would have
notified Faulder's family of his plight and thereby avoided the
fourteen years during which they believed Faulder was dead.14 7
Had Faulder been able to seek consular notification in the
first instance, significant travail would have been spared offi-
cials on both sides of the border. On May 1, 1992 the Canadian
Embassy submitted Note 073 to the United States State Depart-
ment, formally protesting the breach of the Vienna Conven-
tion.148 The State Department asked Texas to investigate,
which it did, finding that the law enforcement officials had vio-
lated the Vienna Convention. 149 Canada again expressed its
disapproval by submitting an amicus curiae brief in support of
Faulder's federal appeal. 150 This cumbersome procedure could
have been ameliorated by a simple mechanism to notify arrested
nationals of their options with regard to consular protection.
146. See supra notes 3, 5, 57 and accompanying text (discussing Faulder's
organic brain damage and the automatic nature of notification in the case of a
mentally or physically handicapped person).
147. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting Faulder's family's
concerns).
148. Canadian Amicus Brief, supra note 6, at 7. The Embassy sent a second
note on July 15, 1992. Id.
149. Id.; see also Texas Attorney General's Letters, supra note 3.
150. See Canadian Amicus Brief, supra note 6.
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CONCLUSION
The rationales underpinning the right to seek consular pro-
tection demand that states should strictly observe the right. If
state practice does not change, violations that threaten the re-
ciprocal nature of consular relations will continue. Individual
aliens must have a judicial remedy for the deprivation of their
right to consular protection; the lack of enforceability could un-
justifiably imperil Americans overseas and undermine the role
of consular relations.
Currently, the United States is both a leading champion
and violator of the right to consular protection. The United
States must act to remedy this grave inconsistency. Justice can-
not be equal where, simply as a result of a defendant's national-
ity and lack of familiarity with our legal precepts, the state
denies him the occasion to fully participate in the judicial pro-
ceedings against him.

